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On anniversary occasions, it is conventional practice to lead
off with a speaker whose assignment it is to describe the major
occurrences in a chosen field during the twenty-five, fifty, or one
hundred year period being commemorated. Who among us has
not been subjected to ceremonial addresses entitled Twenty-Five
Years of Oral Surgery, A Decade of Scientific Hotel Management,
or- as the law reviews would have it- 1849-1949: The Forma-
tive Century in the Law of Undisclosed Principal?
Dean Fordham's letter inviting me to participate in this con-
ference made it quite clear that I was expected to address my
remarks to legal education issues of present significance and vi-
tality and distinctly did not suggest that I start out from 1873, the
year this great University opened its doors. But it is necessary
to the presentation of the ideas I want to offer for discussion
this afternoon th at I begin by tracing very briefly what seem to
me to be the principal lines of development in the philosophy of
American university legal education. And that, I find, cannot
be done without at least an opening reference to certain events
which were taking place at the Harvard Law School three quar-
ters of a century ago.
In 1873 Christopher Columbus Langdell was in his third year
as Dean of the Harvard Law School and devoting his energies
single-mindedly to the installation of the case method, which was
and is the distinguishing characteristic of university law training
in the United States. The enduring quality of Langdell's accom-
plishment appears sufficiently from the fact that every proponent
of a new approach to legal education still finds it unavoidable,
at the very outset, to explain his proposed new venture either as
an improvement or extension of the case method or as a revolt
against it. The status of the case method as a norm in every-
body's thinking about legal education was never more dramati-
cally illustrated than at the 1947 National Law Students Confer-
ence on Legal Education, when Judge Jerome Frank, the most
articulate opponent of the university tradition in American legal
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education, felt it necessary to begin his latest restatement of the
case for clinical "lawyer schools"1 by picking a fight with the
ghost of Christopher Columbus Langdell.
To Langdell the aim of university legal education was the com-
munication to students of scientific knowledge of essential legal
doctrines.2 His concern was with the theory or science of law
not with the arts of the practitioner. The great virtue of the case
method, in the mind of its originator, was that it made possible
the teaching of basic legal principles from what Langdell thought
of as their sources, reported judicial decisions. The essential in-
novations of the case method approach - a more critical attitude
towards judicial decisions and the use of the Socratic method in
classroom discussions -were both thought of as necessary to the
scientific examination of legal principles. Langdell often spoke of
the vocational objective of turning out better trained lawyers and
judges, but the training towards which he aspired was theoretical
training, mastery of a comprehensive system of governing legal
principles, the essential doctrines of the common law.
Few case method law teachers of the present generation would
attempt to justify the method as one suited for the communica-
tion of anything like an encyclopedic knowledge of fundamental
legal principles. We have long since abandoned any attempt at
complete coverage of the theoretical or doctrinal side of the law.
Our present defence of the case method is essentially a practical
or vocational one, that the case method forces the law student to
use legal materials in a manner resembling as closely as manage-
able the use which practicing lawyers make of the same sources
in litigation and in office practice. The great virtue we now claim
for the case method is that it is the study and teaching procedure
best suited for the development of the "legal mind"-respect for
facts, abilities at case analysis and synthesis, habitual distrust of
the undocumented assertion and the easy generalizations. This,
I suppose, is still a justification of the case method in terms of
theoretical training, but the emphasis has shifted from communi-
cation of present knowledge of case law principles to development
of the ability to extract the governing principle from any group
of judicial decisions which the law graduate may be required to
handle in practice or on the bench.
From this "legal mind" justification of our characteristic case
method, it is only a short step to an approach to legal education
which puts the emphasis not on a grounding of students in legal
'Published as A Plea for Lawyer Schools, 56 YAIx L. J. 1303 (1947).
2 On Langdell's case system assumption and objectives, see REm, TRAIniG
FOR = PoBac PROFESSioN or LAw 369-381 (1921); and Beale, The History
of Legal Education in 1 LAw: A CErTURy oF PROGRESS 104 (1937).
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theory but on a schooling of students in the arts and skills of the
profession. The best statement I have seen of an out-and-out
"skill" approach to legal education is in the 1944 report of the
Committee on Curriculum of the Association of American Law
Schools: "Legal education is in proper essence and purpose a
training for work as a lawyer, and .. . knowledge of the law is
only one of many needed lines of training. '3 My guess is that a
very substantial majority of the teachers now active in university
law schools would subscribe to this "professional skills" objective
as the right emphasis. Certainly the greater part of the re-exami-
nation of law school curricula and teaching methods since the end
of World War II has been with the avowed purposes of intensify-
ing law school training in traditional case law skills and adding
training in such newer skills as counselling, drafting, and law
administration.4 Progressive bar examiners, in New Jersey and
elsewhere, have caught the "skill" religion and plan to recast
their examinations in a pattern which will assign less weight to
theoretical knowledge and more to the applicant's performance
in counselling, drafting and other arts of the profession.
So far, though in fragmentary and inexact terms, I have traced
a shift in legal education emphasis from what do students know
about legal principles to what can students do with legal materi-
als and in lawyer situations. A third and increasingly important
school of thought in American university law schools would carry
this re-examination of existing legal education another step and
measure its adequacy in terms of a more ultimate aim- the uses
to which law school graduates are to put their knowledge of
legal principles and their developed professional skills. The best
known statement of this third emphasis is in the 1943 article,
Legal Education and Public Policy5 by Professors Lasswell and
McDougal of the Yale Law School:
A first indispensable step towards the effective reform
of legal education is to clarify ultimate aims. We submit
this basic proposition: if legal education in the contem-
porary world is adequately to serve the needs of a free
and productive commonwealth, it must be conscious, effi-
cient, and systematic training for policy-making.
The specific proposals which the authors advance as means to-
wards the accomplishment of their objective have caused just
3 1944 HA BooK 159, at 160. The Report of the Committee on Curriculum
is reprinted as The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COL. L. REv. 345
(1945).
4 The best skill-organized curriculum proposal I have seen is set out in
the 1949 report of the Curriculum Committee of the College of Law, The Ohio
State University.
553 YAm L. J. 203, at 206 (1943).
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about as much disagreement in the law schools as attended Lang-
dell's pedagogical revolution of 75-odd years ago. I know that I
found and still find myself worried by the use of the terms "effi-
cient" and "systematic" as descriptive of any phase of liberal uni-
versity study. But the new emphasis is a dramatic and useful
pointing up of the responsibility of university professional schools,
a reminder that knowledgeable and skillful lawyers are not nec-
essarily assets of society unless their aptitudes and abilities are
directed to socially useful ends.
Shall the emphasis of university legal education be put on
knowledge of the law, on artistry in the skills of the profession,
or on wisdom and effectiveness in policy-making? The very pos-
ing of the question as a choice of mutually inconsistent alterna-
tives indicates sufficiently its unreality. Certainly there is no
university law school of any consequence which is exclusively a
"knowledge" school, a "skill" school, or a "policy-making" school.
All law schools, and I suspect all individual law teachers, aspire
to a training which will produce graduates genuinely learned in
the law, apt in the arts and skills of the profession, and equipped
to participate in the decisions of policy which constitute an in-
escapable part of the work of the practicing lawyer. Much of
the most heated of present legal education controversy on the
aims of legal education reduces itself, on analysis, to dispute as
to the extent to which a law teacher should make explicit the
convictions which underlie his own philosophy of law. But the
three emphases sketched during the past ten minutes seem to
me real enough and significant enough to be used as the basis
for considering the minimum insights which must be communi-
cated to a law student if he is to be given anything like adequate
schooling in the knowledge and understanding of legal principles
and processes, in the use of legal skills, or in the science and art
of policy-making.
During the rest of my discussion this afternoon, I shall as-
sume that there is nothing exclusive about education for knowl-
edge, education for skills, or education for policy-making. The
three emphases, we would doubtless all agree, are related phases
of the training of the complete lawyer. The question of which
emphasis should be given priority in the planning of law school
curricula, in the shaping of law school methods, and in the choice
and assignment of law school faculty members, will be left to
commentators better qualified and more venturesome than I.
My point is that there are certain major respects in which exist-
ing law school training must be held inadequate, whether judged
in terms of communication of theoretical knowledge, in terms of
professional skill training, or in terms of conscious training for
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policy-making.
The three principal shortcomings in present day university
legal education are, it seems to me, the following: First, the al-
most complete failure of the law schools to communicate to law
students a working awareness of the realities and potentialities
of the legislative process and of the problems and methods which
characterize the legislative development of the law; Second, the
"once over lightly" treatment given in the law schools to consid-
eration of the legal profession as an institution in the administra-
tion of justice and to analysis and discussion of the status and
responsibilities of members of the bar; and Third, the oblique
and usually hesitant consideration which most law courses give
to the values which underlie and provide the basic directions of
growth of our legal system.
Each of the three insights suggested by this listing of short-
comings is, I propose to show, essential to a rounded knowledge
of legal doctrines and processes, essential to professional perform-
ance in the skills of the profession, and, perhaps above all, essen-
tial to useful participation by law school graduates in the activi-
ties which we have come to call lawyer policy-making.
LEGISLATION iN THE LAW ScHooLs
Most of my own work for the past few years has been in the
field of Legislation; so it is natural enough that I begin with a
consideration of what needs to be done in the law schools to com-
municate to law students a sharper understanding of the poten-
tialities of the legislative process and at least an awareness of
the problems and methods which characterize the legislative de-
velopment of the law. No one in this company will take issue
with the statement that legislation has attained considerably more
than a position of parity with judge-made law in the American
legal system. The great legal and social issues of our day are
and will be decided, one way or the other, by legislative, not by
judicial action. For, as Chief Justice Stone phrased it, ". . . it
has become increasingly our habit to look for the formulation of
legal doctrines suited to new situations not to the courts, as
through most of the life of the common law, but to the legisla-
tures, and the primary record of the most important changes in
the law in our time is to be found in the statute books."
What is the bearing of this dominance of legislation as a form
or source of law on the three approaches to legal education brief-
ly outlined at the outset of my discussion? In terms of education
for knowledge, we must carry over to the study of legislation the
6 The Common Law in the United States, 50 HAv. L. REv. 4, at 12 (1936).
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fundamental idea, long accepted in the study of judicial decisions,
that legal doctrines cannot be studied effectively in abstraction
from the law-making process which developed and shaped them.
Seventy-five years experience with case-method law teaching has
convinced us all that common law principles can be grasped only
on the basis of thorough-going student appreciation of the reali-
ties of the judicial process. Is it not equally beyond dispute that
the governing legislative principles which run through every area
of private and public law can be understood and appraised only
by law students who have the same deeply-grounded insight into
the realities of the legislative process?
If we approach legal education, as I think most of us do, with
the primary emphasis on the skills of the profession, equal ac-
count must be taken of the lawyer's needs in a legislative age.
The practitioner who aspires to usefulness and distinction in the
profession must command a variety of what we may call "legis-
lative skills", as well as the more conventional case law skills so
effectively developed by good case method teaching. By "legisla-
tive skills" I mean more than aptitude in statutory interpretation,
important as that art is in contemporary law practice. For law-
yers everywhere are increasingly being called on to take part in
the drafting of statutes, regulations, and ordinances, in the pres-
entation of facts and points of view to federal and state legislative
committees and municipal law-making bodies, and in the rep-
resentation of clients before legislative investigating committees.
And, when we consider the arts of counselling, it is evident that
the lawyer's prediction, on the basis of which long-range busi-
ness action is to be taken, is at least as likely to be a forecast of
probable future lines of legislative development as a prediction
of the course of future judicial decision.
The significance in law school training of a thorough ground-
ing in legislative processes and methods is, or should be, most
clearly underlined by those who approach legal education with
the emphasis on policy-making. Legislative action is the charac-
teristic, and by all odds the most important, form of policy-making
in a representative democracy. Judicial policy-making-inescap-
able and important as it is -is at most interstitial and subject to
being overridden altogether by subsequent legislative action. If
legal education is, at least in one aspect, "conscious training for
policy-making", a first priority must be given to the communica-
tion to students of a working familiarity with the legislative proc-
ess and legislative methods by which "policy" is raised from the
realm of criticism and argument to the status of binding law.
Effective as present methods and materials are in matters of
case law, contemporary legal education is grievously behind the
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times in its handling of legislative realities. The case method,
even as employed by its most masterful and progressive expo-
nents, is aimed essentially at an understanding of judicial doc-
trines and methods and is not at all suited for the presentation
of legislative materials. American jurisprudence, even- or per-
haps, particularly- so-called "realist jurisprudence" is concerned
almost entirely with analysis and interpretation of the judicial
process. The great names in American jurisprudence are Holmes,
Cardozo, Llewellyn, and others to whom the problems and prac-
tices of the judge are the focus of interest and study. Recent law
school boasts of "increasing attention to legislative problems" are,
nine times out of ten, founded on little more than a few case
method courses in which the principal judicial decisions studied
involve the interpretation of statutes rather than the use of judi-
cial precedents. And, even there, the emphasis is on what the
judge does (or what the advocate does) with finished statutory
sources in particular litigated cases- not on how the statutory
materials came to be what they are.
It is particularly disappointing, I think, to find that most of
the "policy teaching" now going on to some extent at almost
every law school is 90% policy in theory and almost entirely
divorced from the practical steps necessary to get the better poli-
cy where it belongs, on the statute books. How many "policy
teachers", at your law school or at mine or even at Yale, follow
up a stimulating session on abstract policy with such down-to-
earth assignments or questions as: "What are the most persuasive
sources of information to use in supporting a better legislative
rule in this matter before a state legislative committee?"; "Draft
a statute suitable, for immediate introduction into the state legis-
lature, which will embody what we have agreed on as the better
policy."; "Would the Banking and Currency Committees of the
House and Senate, on the basis of your study of their work so
far during the 81st Congress, accept your proposal in its present,
or in a modified, form?" I have not been following the recently
published casebooks as closely as I should, but I wonder how
many extracts from committee hearings, committee reports, de-
bates, veto messages, law revision commission reports, and other
legislative sources are to be found in the latest "policy science"
casebooks. Policy criticism is good. Policy accomplishment is a
great deal better. And that accomplishment is a matter of insight
and hard work in the legislative development of the law.
I am not suggesting at all that we take as our objective the
training of large numbers of our graduates for careers as profes-
sional legislative draftsmen. The jobs are not there, of course,
although the extent to which law graduates dominate the mem-
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bership of federal, state, and municipal law-making bodies should
cause us considerable concern as to the adequacy of our present
training in statute law-making. My present point is rather that
the approach of the practical legislative draftsman is uniquely
instructive in the training of a lawyer for service in the condi-
tions of contemporary law practice. No teaching approach I know
of is as well calculated to put the emphasis on creative, construc-
tive action, rather than on negative criticism of the workman-
ship of past lawyers, judges, and legislators. Continued work-
ing through of difficult legislative programs will give the law
student completely new insight into the realities of statutory
interpretation and law administration. But, more important even
than this, it will give him the beginning of a professional appre-
ciation of all that is involved in translating a bright idea into
practical and progressive legal action.
The organization of a substantial number of law courses around
the principal legislative problems in the fields under study would
make possible a really effective integration of social science and
other non-legal materials into the law school program. When I
was in law school in the immediately pre-New Deal years, this
effort to broaden the content of legal training by making use
of the findings of related social science disciplines was usually
hitched to discussion of the Brandeis Brief in due process litiga-
tion, a technique of considerably less consequence today under
the Supreme Court's present standards of judicial review. But
legislative problems must be tackled with the aid of all informa-
tive sources of guidance, and law students experienced in the
employment of the methods of the legislative draftsman would be
far less inclined than our students are today to discount non-
legal materials as window-dressing data of only "fringe" import-
ance in appraisal and development of the law.
I hope that it is not too much of a digression from my imme-
diate point to add that wider use of a teaching approach stress-
ing the constructive attributes of the legislative process would
be as good for the law teachers involved, and for the universities
which employ them, as it would be for the students. In a pro-
gressive society like our own, the lawyer is, above all, the organi-
zer of scientific knowledge for practical social ends. Much of the
scholarly research being conducted on American university cam-
puses would have great value for the legislative development of
the law if raw school faculty members took the initiative in put-
ting these research findings into the form necessary for their ef-
fective presentation to legislative committees and administrative
policy makers. A law teacher who, in the classroom, regularly
uses the methods of the legislative draftsman is likely to bring
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the same approach to bear on his outside activities. No law school
I know of has yet awakened to the endless opportunities which
now exist for working collaboration on practical legislative prob-
lems between the law school and the other schools and faculties
which make up a great American university.
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AS A SUBJECT FOR LAW SCHOOL STUDY
The second fault I have to find with existing university legal
education relates to the "once over lightly" treatment given in
even the best law schools to study of the legal profession as an
essential institution in the administration of justice and to con-
sideration of the status, opportunities, and responsibilities of mem-
bers of the bar. It is fair to say, I think, that our law schools
give closer study to every other institution of any importance in
law administration than to the legal profession itself. We classi-
fy our law schools as "professional" schools, but examination of
typical law school bulletins discloses this meager record: an occa-
sional senior elective in the Legal Profession, some attention to
problems of professional organization and discipline in a third
year course like Judicial Administration, and here and there, a
sprinkling of one hour courses in Legal Ethics. And, from all I
have heard, the approach to the profession and its obligations
characteristic of the usual law school course in Legal Ethics is
not very different from the approach followed at Branch Rickey's
Florida baseball academy in explaining the new balk rule to
rookie pitchers from the Tri-State League.
Whatever the law school's primary emphasis may be-on
knowledge, on skills, or on policy-making- a law student's train-
ing is incomplete if he leaves law school largely uninformed about
the traditions, standards, and problems of the profession in which
he will spend his life. If the criterion is knowledge of legal prin-
ciples and processes, it is enough' to state the known fact that the
action of lawyers outside the courthouse affects and conditions
the operation of legal rules fully as much as does the action of
judges in contested cases. How, for example, can law students
understand and appraise the existing legal principles governing
liability for injuries resulting from automobile accidents if the
focus of law school examination is too narrow to include such in-
fluencing factors as the availability of adequate legal services for
persons of modest income, the causes and incidents of ambulance
chasing, and the percentage of the amount of recovery in personal
injury litigation typically required as lawyer's fees?
Law school skill training is equally unrealistic unless the prac-
titioner techniques in which students are to be schooled and drilled
are presented in the full institutional setting of their use. Four
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years trial and error with a first semester, first year course in
Legal Method has brought home to me that law students cannot
be given anything like a "feel" for the arts of written and oral
advocacy unless they first have an informed understanding of
the role of the advocate in the administration of justice.7 Skill
training in counselling and negotiation will hardly be very profit-
able to students who know how to go through the motions but
have only hazy ideas concerning the working realities of the
lawyer-client relationships.
More effective recognition of the professional character of le-
gal education is required, particularly, whenever law schools set
out on the high enterprise of training their students for policy-
naking. For the lawyer is not a policy-maker without portfolio,
an unattached and wholly independent doer of good deeds. The
average successful practitioner gets into what we call policy-
making not as the result of any choice or fondness for power on
his part but because participation in policy decisions constitutes
an inherent and inescapable part of his regular professional serv-
ice for his clients. The lawyer's policy-making obligations and
opportunities cannot usefully be examined outside the context of
the lawyer's working relationships with his clients, with other
members of the profession, and with the courts and other agencies
of government.
What practical steps can be taken to bring university legal
education closer to professional realities? In the first semester
of law study, by separate course or otherwise, we must see to it
that students develop at least the beginnings of insight concern-
ing the history and organization of the profession, the function of
the advocate in the operation of our legal system, the conditions
and variety of contemporary law practice, and the professional
considerations underlying existing standards of legal ethics. But
a more sustained effort is required. Throughout the full three
years of law study there should be brought into every course, as
a part of its essential subject matter, at least some descriptive
and critical discussion of the status and work of the lawyers sig-
nificantly active in that field of law administration.
A few familiar examples should be sufficient to clinch my
present point. How adequate and realistic is a course in Corpora-
tions in which no analysis is attempted of the work and condi-
tions of employment of corporation "house counsel" and of regu-
larly retained outside counsel? Or a course in Labor Law in
which the unique relationships between labor lawyers and the
7 This point is developed in context in Jones, Notes on the Teaching of
Legal Method, 1 J. LwAL EDuc. 13, at 17 (1948).
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unions they represent are given only passing comment? What is
more relevant to a professional course in Criminal Law than an
informed and candid discussion of the recruitment, qualifications,
and standards of the criminal bar, especially in the great metro-
politan areas? Nor are these illustrations intended to be exclu-
sive. A law school course in Administrative Law is incomplete
without consideration of the kinds of work done by lawyers in
the federal, state, and municipal legal service and a course in
Legislation unprofessional unless it takes account of the issues
suggested by Justice Brandeis' observation that the lawyer-client
relationship is governed by different considerations in legislative
representation than in court litigation. Systematic law school at-
tention to this professionalizing objective would do a great deal,
I think, to narrow the known and regretted gap from law school
to law practice. The interim and final reports of the Survey of
the Legal Professions will provide urgently needed materials for
law school study of the profession and its work.
So far I have been proposing this increased stress on profes-
sional standards, relationships, and problems as one designed to
make the law student a more effective individual member of the
bar after his graduation. The further point is that this emphasis,
sustained throughout the three law school years, would give law
graduates a more vigorous interest in the activities of the organ-
ized bar. Because of its unique position in American society,
particularly in political matters, the legal profession is a popular
target of attack from almost every other element in the national
community, from social reformers to industrial leaders. Virtual-
ly all expressions of lay dissatisfaction with "the law" are in reali-
ty reflections of dissatisfaction with the practices of lawyers.9
The organized bar, to date, has a record of failure- or, at
best, of only spotty success- in such of its essential activities as
the elimination of unsavory practices by a minority of the mem-
bers of the profession, the establishment of effective public rela-
tions to counteract certain commonly heard but unjustified com-
plaints against lawyers, and the development of workable plans
to meet urgent professional problems, notably the provision of
adequate legal service for low-income and middle-income groups.
8 Porter, Surveying the Legal Profession, 32 J. Amu JuD. Soc'y. 134 (1949)
is an excellent interim report on the objectives of the Survey and its methods
to date. My colleague, Professor Elliott E. Cheatham, plans to incorporate the
essential findings of the Survey in a second edition of his thoughtful and
stimulating CASES AND OTHE MATERIALS ON m LzoAL PaorEssioN (1938).
9 See Smith, Complaints Against Lawyers (February 11, 1949), a memor-
andum submitted by the Director of the Survey of the Legal Profession to the
Survey's Advisory Committee of Laymen.
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A principal lack in the work of the organized bar has, I think,
been the want of a common, unifying professional tradition, shared
by all lawyers of all shades of political and economic opinion. An
intensified law school emphasis on study of the legal profession,
its work, and its standards might provide the basis for wider and
more effective participation by recent law school graduates in
organized bar activities.
EDUCATION IN LEGAL VALUES
So far, in discussing the aims of legal education and certain
insights which seem to me indispensable to the development of
student knowledge, skill, and policy-making capacity, I have been
on safe, or at least familiar, ground and have offered my specific
prescriptions with respectable confidence concerning their neces-
sity and appropriateness. I proceed now to a consideration of the
place of values in the education of lawyers with full awareness
that I am may be getting out beyond my depth. But great issues
are better mishandled than dodged altogether, and there is no ignor-
ing the fact that most university legal education is subject to sharp
criticism for the hesitant and oblique consideration which is given
to the values which underlie our legal order and control the direc-
tions of its development.
In the old textbook and lecture schools, legal rules were pre-
sented as if they were self-justifying units in a wholly autonomous
system. The case method brought with it a more critical attitude
towards judicial decisions, but the critisism and appraisal of exist-
ing law undertaken in the traditional case method course went
on almost entirely in terms of doctrinal consistency. Classroom
discussions of the "soundness" of a casebook decision related, nine-
teen times out of twenty, to the question whether the holding of
the case was supported by legal precedent and legal principle. It
was the rare law teacher who required his students to dig beneath
the doctrines and concepts of the existing law to uncover the no-
tions of expediency and judgments of value in which they were
rooted.
One necessary corrective to this undue law school preoccupa-
tion with formal doctrines was furnished by the loose federation
of jurisprudential freethinkers known as the "legal realists." In
almost every aspect - casebook organization, teaching approach,
law review scholarship -contemporary legal education shows the
influence of realist insistence on the instrumental character of
legal rules and the realist warning that the doctrines announced
in judicial decisions are not to be taken at face value. A law
student of average perception does not get very far into his first
semester before we make abundantly clear to him the extent to
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which judges are beyond doctrinal control, the frequency of the
situations in which the judge has a choice between alternative
decisions, either of which can be supported by citation of respec-
table authority.
A healthy scepticism towards the letter of the law is, we would
all agree, a desirable professional attitude. But the "cynical acid"
of unremitting legal realism is a strong dose for law students,
particularly in the early stages of their development. But what
is the net effect on the earnest beginner in the law who sees legal
principles stripped of their pretensions and cut down to size -
and nothing else provided in their place as the basis for under-
standing and prediction? We see in every law school class at
least a few examples of that regrettable product, the junior grade
Thurman Arnold,'0 to whom all principle is rationalization and
the most tightly reasoned judicial decision a symbolic conceal-
ment of discreditable motivations.
There are many and varied recent manifestations of dissatis-
faction with, the debunking side of legal realism as a complete
philosophy of law and legal education. Running through the
writings of the most effective of the legal realists is the continu-
ing effort to construct a theory of justice on the foundation of
pragmatic method." The same drive to extend the province of
American jurisprudence beyond scepticism and the study of tech-
niques appears in the attempts, by McDougal and Lasswell and
others, to formulate catalogues of "democratic values" for the di-
rection of legal policy-making. 12 In a very different camp, we
have seen a sharp increase in interest, particularly since the end
of World War H, in the approach and sanctions of natural law.13
Whatever the form in which our inquiry for the reason and sanc-
tion behind the rule finds expression, most of us, I think, are
becoming a great deal less defensive and self-conscious than we
used to be about participating in the age old quest for a right-
eous law.'4
The values which underlie our legal order, and fix the ends
towards which legal rules and methods serve as means, are the
10 The reference is to the Thurman Arnold of TnE SyoLs oF Govm mar
(1935) and THE FoLKLoR OF CAPrrAUiSm (1937), not to the respected procedure
scholar, ex-Assistant Attorney General and ex-C.C.A, judge of the same name.
"1 The best available discussion of the affirmative side of the work of the
legal realists is GALVAN, LwAL REussmr AxD JusTicE (1942).
12 Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 5.
13 See Wilkin, Natural Law: Its Robust Revival Defies the Positivists, 35
A.B.AJ. 192 (1949); and NATuIAL LAw INSTrT PSOCEEDMnGs, Notre Dame
University (1949).
14For service to this cause, a medal should have been struck off for Pro-
fessor Lon Fuller's Tar LAw IN QUEsT Or ITsEL (1942).
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first concern of university law training. These values are the
framework of any enduring and realistic knowledge of the law,
its processes, and its institutions. Skill training is only shadow
boxing if divorced from the consideration of values, since our law
is not very often in such a sorry condition that the righteousness
of a cause is not the best possible thing that can be said for it,
and, as its founders recognized from the outset, "policy science"
unguided by clear and constant perception of values is, at best,
a kind of Dale Carnegie enterprise and, at worst, an education
for membership in an undemocratic and irresponsible elite corps.
No course is acceptably taught in a university law school un-
less the student has at least these questions in front of his mind
at every stage of analysis and discussion of the specific materials
and problems with which the course is concerned: What are the
underlying social values which the law seeks to maintain and
advance in this field? Are they the right values? Are the means
now being employed by courts, legislators, and administrative of-
ficers wisely calculated to advance the ends sought?1 5 This kind
of classroom inquiry will, of course, be most difficult of all in
the fields- one thinks immediately of Property, Family Law, and
Constitutional Law- which are characterized by the existence
of conflicting and competing values. But this is the lawyer's in-
evitable problem when the legal order, as in the United States
today, applies to a changing and developing society.
Current law school concern with the moral content of legal
education proceeds from an awareness, which the best case meth-
od teachers have always had, that three years' preoccupation with
sources as formal as judicial opinions and statutes can have a
deadening effect on the moral sensibilities of students. It is dis-
turbing to see, as I think we all do, that our third year students
are less alert to issues of justice, and less concerned about them,
than they were during their first semesters of law study. To
offset this apparent attribute of formal legal materials, the law
teacher must be more than a master of ceremonies and must use
his characteristic Socratic method with all the persistence and
at least a trace of the genius of Socrates himself. And no reason
appears why a teacher of law should be more reluctant to record
himself on an issue of value than he is to express himself as to
the adequacy of the support for a finding of fact.
How, then, is the line to be drawn and maintained between
moral education and propagandist indoctrination? I certainly am
not rash enough to attempt a teacher's manual, but a few mini-
5 Professor Jerome Michaers statement of ends and means in procedural
law in the Introduction to his casebook, Tai ELEENTS OF LEGAL CoamovEnsY
(1948) should be required reading for future casebook editors in all fields.
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mum essentials can be suggested. First, there must be an ever-
present awareness, on the teacher's part, that fair and reason-
able men can differ in their value judgments as well as on other
issues. The comforting philosophic theory that everybody sub-
scribes to the same ultimate values has never been very convinc-
ing to me. Value statements on which all men agree are likely
to be too general to be of much use in the handling of specific
legal problems. The second requirement is complete frankness
and candor in the statement of the teacher's position on the issue
of value presented. In the teaching of mature students, it is the
concealment of value judgments and convictions rather than their
honest and open statement, which is unworthy of a liberal edu-
cational tradition. Third -and this is not always observed-
there must be complete fair play on the teacher's part in seeing
to it that his students have available to them the informational
materials necessary to intelligent support of the other side, the
side opposed to the teacher's personal views on the issue of value
up for discussion. And, finally, every law school should arrive
at a conscious and long range plan of faculty selection and as-
signment designed to give a fair hearing before its students to
every honest and responsible point of view in our society con-
cerning the nature and source of ultimate legal values.
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